The Stable Matching Problem with Couples (SMP-C) is a ubiquitous real-world extension of the stable matching problem (SMP) involving complementarities. Although SMP can be solved in polynomial time, SMP-C is NP-Complete. Hence, it is not clear which, if any, of the theoretical results surrounding the canonical SMP problem apply in this setting. In this paper, we use a recently-developed SAT encoding to solve SMP-C exactly. This allows us to enumerate all stable matchings for any given instance of SMP-C. With this tool, we empirically evaluate some of the properties that have been hypothesized to hold for SMP-C. We take particular interest in investigating if, as the size of the market grows, the percentage of instances with unique stable matchings also grows. While we did not find this trend among the random problem instances we sampled, we did find that the percentage of instances with an resident optimal matching seems to more closely follow the trends predicted by previous conjectures. We also define and investigate resident Pareto optimal stable matchings, finding that, even though this is important desideratum for the deferred acceptance style algorithms previously designed to solve SMP-C, they do not always find one. We also investigate strategy-proofness for SMP-C, showing that even if only one stable matching exists, residents still have incentive to misreport their preferences. However, if a problem has a resident optimal stable matching, we show that residents cannot manipulate via truncation.
Introduction
Stable matching problems are ubiquitous, with many realworld applications, ranging from dating markets, to labour markets, to the school choice problem. Arguably the most well-known of these applications is the residency matching problem [Niederle et al., 2008; Roth, 1984; Abdulkadiroglu et al., 2005] , instantiated in the large National Resident Matching Program (NRMP), among others. Importantly, these markets have adapted to the needs of their participants over the years, allowing them to more richly express their preferences, or guarantee certain properties of the match valuable to participants [NRMP, 2013] . To address the problem of couples wanting to coordinate their placements, the NRMP began allowing couples to jointly express their preferences over residency programs. We call the resulting matching problem the Stable Matching Problem with Couples (SMP-C).
As with the standard SMP, the goal of SMP-C is to find a matching such that no pair (one from each side of the market) has an incentive to defect from their assigned placement. Such a matching is called stable. In their seminal paper on stable matching, Gale and Shapley provide a polytime Deferred Acceptance (DA) algorithm guaranteed to find a stable, male-optimal (resident-optimal) matching [1962] . They also proved many useful properties of SMP; e.g., a unique stable matching always exists, and a stable resident-optimal matching always exists (a matching is resident-optimal if no resident is better off in any other stable matching).
However, when a pair of doctors are allowed to jointly specify their rankings, many of these desirable properties no longer hold. In particular, SMP-C is NP-complete [Ronn, 1990] . Also, a stable matching might not exist. Even when it does exist a resident-optimal matching might not exist. SMP-C is not the only NP-complete extension of SMP. Previous literature on these other NP-complete extensions has investigated techniques that are not guaranteed to return stable matchings, such as local search techniques (e.g., [Marx and Schlotter, 2011; Gelain et al., 2010] ). Another approach has entailed encoding these NP-complete stable matching problems (e.g., the stable matching problem with incomplete lists and ties) into other NP-complete formalisms such as constraint satisfaction problems (CSP) or satisfiability (SAT) (e.g., [Gent and Prosser, 2002; Gent et al., 2001; Unsworth and Prosser, 2005] ). The advantage of such encodings is that effective solvers exist for CSP and SAT. However, these works do not address SMP-C.
Previous work on SMP-C has mainly focused on providing sound but not complete algorithms that extend the DA algorithm to deal with couples [Roth and Peranson, 1999; Kojima et al., 2013] . A new SAT encoding for SMP-C was recently developed [Drummond et al., 2015] , showing very promising results when run on a competitive SAT solver [Biere, 2013] . This encoding, SAT-E, scales fairly well, and is sometimes able find stable matchings for problems on which the DA-style algorithms cannot find any. Importantly, this new SAT encoding allows for flexibility unavailable in DAstyle algorithms: adding new constraints and objectives can be as simple as adding another constraint to the encoding.
In this paper, we use this flexibility to allow us to enumerate all possible stable matches of an instance of SMP-C. We also introduce a constraint that allows us to, given a stable solution to SMP-C, determine if that matching is resident Pareto optimal, and if it is not, find a resident Pareto optimal matching. This new machinery allows us to empirically evaluate interesting properties of SMP-C. In particular, we are interested in the following properties: when do instances of SMP-C have a unique matching? If an instance has multiple stable matchings, when is there a resident optimal matching? How does the existence of a stable matching change as the percentage of couples in the market increases?
Previous theoretical work has addressed some of these questions; Ashlagi et al. and Kojima et al. proved theoretical results regarding the guaranteed existence of a stable matching, if the size of the market grows sufficiently faster than the percentage of couples in the matching [2014; 2013] . Immorlica and Mahdian proved that, for SMP, and a fixed length ROL (with everyone drawing from some given distribution), the chance of drawing a problem with a unique stable matching goes to 1 as the size of the market goes to infinity. However, to our knowledge, no analogous results exist for SMP-C. We thus create our experiments in an attempt to simulate the settings in these papers.
Also, previous work has conjectured that some of the properties present in SMP may carry over to SMP-C. Roth and Peranson hypothesized that the reason that they see few opportunities for strategic behaviour in their data is that there are few stable matchings in large SMP-C markets [1999] . Furthermore, Roth and Peranson cite that strategy-proofness and resident optimality are desirable properties for stable matchings.
In this paper, we first provide a theoretical contribution, showing that, for SMP-C, we are not guaranteed resident strategy-proofness, even in a problem with a unique stable matching. We do show, however, when a matching has resident optimal solution, residents cannot manipulate via truncation; they must manipulate via reordering their preferences. We thus show that, for SMP-C, uniqueness and resident optimality are both insufficient for strategy-proofness, but, in certain situations, it is "harder" for the residents to manipulate. We then provide two extensions to the already existing SAT-E encoding for SMP-C, allowing us to enumerate all stable matches and find a resident Pareto optimal match. We use these tools to empirically explore the space of SMP-C solutions. Our experiments suggest that Roth and Peranson's observation that there were few instances where residents could improve by truncation is due to the high fraction of instances that have a resident optimal matching, a fraction that appears to increase with instance size.
Background
We cast our formalization of SMP-C (stable matching problem with couples) in terms of the well known residency matching problem, a labour market where doctors are placed into hospital residency programs [Roth and Peranson, 1999] .
Informally, doctors wish to be placed into (matched with) some hospital program, and programs wish to accept some number of doctors. Both doctors and hospitals have preferences over who they are matched with; expressed as ranked order lists (ROLs). Some doctors are paired into couples, and these couples provide a joint ROL specifying their joint preferences. Both doctors and hospitals can provide incomplete lists, any alternative not listed is considered to be unacceptable. That is, they would rather not be matched at all than matched to an alternative not on their ROL. The SMP-C problem to find a stable matching, such that no doctor-hospital pair has an incentive to defect from the assigned matching.
SMP-C
More formally, let D be a set of doctors and P be a set of programs. Since there is a preference to be unmatched over an unacceptable match, we use nil to denote this "doctor" or "program" alternative: matching a program p to nil indicates that p has an unfilled slot while matching a doctor d to nil indicates that d was not placed into any program. We use D + and P + to denote the sets D ∪ {nil } and P ∪ {nil } respectively.
The doctors are divided into two disjoint subsets, S ⊆ D and D \ S . S is the set of single doctors and D \ S is the set of doctors that are in couple relationships. We specify the couples by a set of pairs
2 ) ∈ C we say that d 1 and d 2 are each other's partner. We require that every doctor who is not single (i.e., every doctor in D \ S ) have one and only one partner in C .
Each program p ∈ P has an integer quota cap p > 0. This quota determines the maximum number of doctors p can accept (i.e., p's capacity).
Everyone participating in the matching market has preferences over their alternatives. Each participant a specifies their preferences in a ROL which lists a's preferred matches from most preferred to least preferred. The ROLs of single doctors d ∈ S contain programs from P + ; the ROLs of couples c ∈ C contain pairs of programs from P + × P + ; and the ROLs of programs p ∈ P contain doctors from D + . Every ROL is terminated by nil (couple ROLS are terminated by (nil , nil )) since being unmatched is always the least preferred option, but is preferred to any option not on participant's a's ROL.
The order of items on a's ROL defines a partial ordering relation where x a y indicates that x appears before y on a's ROL or x = y. We define a , a , and a in terms of a and equality in the standard way. We say that x is acceptable to a if x a nil . (Note that unacceptable matches are not ordered by a .)
We define a choice function Ch p () for programs p ∈ P . Given a set of doctors R, Ch p (R) returns the subset of R that p would prefer to accept. 
Finally, we use the function rank a (x) to find the index of match x in a's rol : rank a (x) = i iff x appears at index i (zero-based) on a's ROL, rol a , or |rol a | if x does not appear on rol a . Also we use rol a as an indexable vector, e.g., if x is acceptable to a then rol a [rank a (x)] = x.
Stable Matchings
Definition 1 (Matching). A matching µ is a mapping from D to P + . We say that a doctor d is matched to a program p under µ if µ(d) = p, and that p is matched to
We want to find a matching where no doctor-program pair has an incentive to defect. We call the pairs that do have an incentive to defect blocking pairs. First we define the condition willAccept(p, R, µ) to mean that program p would prefer to accept a set of doctors R over its current match µ −1 (p):
Note that if p is already matched to R under µ then p will accept R. Definition 2 (Blocking Pairs for a Matching µ). 1. A single doctor d ∈ S and a program p ∈ P is a blocking pair for µ if and only if 
Definition 4 (Stable Matching). A matching µ is stable if and only if it is individually rational and no blocking pairs for it exist.
Residence Preferred Matchings
The set of stable matchings can be quite large. When there are no couples (i.e., in SMP) this set is always non-empty [Gale and Shapley, 1962] and has a nice structure: it forms a lattice under the partial order R defined below [Knuth, 1976] . Definition 5 (Residence Preferred Matchings). A matching µ 1 is resident preferred to another µ 2 when for all a ∈ S ∪ C we have that µ 1 (a) a µ 2 (a). We denote this relationship as µ 1 R µ 2 . We also define R , ≺ R , and R in terms of R and equality in the standard way. When µ 1 R µ 2 we say that µ 1 dominates µ 2 .
In other words, µ i R µ 2 if every doctor and couple gets the same or a better match in µ 1 as in µ 3 and at least one doctor or couple gets a better match.
The lattice structure and the fact there can only be a finite number of matchings means that for SMP there is always a resident-optimal matching.
Definition 6 (Resident Optimal Matching). We say that a matching µ is resident optimal, written R opt (µ) when µ is stable and µ R µ for all other stable matchings µ (µ dominates all other stable matchings).
Note that, we restrict the resident-optimal matching to be stable. It can be observed that for any resident r (couple (r 1 , r 2 )) µ(r) ((µ(r 1 ), µ(r 2 )) is the best match offered by any stable matching when R opt (µ).
Resident-optimality is generally cited as an important property for stable matching algorithms (e.g., [Gale and Shapley, 1962; Roth and Peranson, 1999] ). In the presence of couples however, stable matchings might not exist and even when they do there have no lattice structure under R . However, the R is still well defined and for SMP-C leads to potentially multiple Pareto optimal matchings.
Definition 7 (Resident Pareto Optimal Matchings). We say that a matching µ is resident Pareto optimal, written RP opt (µ) when µ is stable and there does not exist another stable matching µ such that µ R µ .
It is easy to see that in SMP-C every stable matching µ either is an RP opt or is dominated by an RP opt matching. This means that an SMP-C instance has an R opt matching if and only if it has a unique RP opt matching. As we will see in Section 5 it is often the case that SMP-C instances have more than one RP opt matching (and thus no R opt matching).
3 Strategy-Proofness and R opt Existence for SMP-C
For an SMP instance the mechanism that returns the R opt matching in response to the stated preferences is strategyproof with respect to the residents. That is, it is a dominant strategy for each resident to state their true preferences [Roth and Sotomayor, 1992] . To our knowledge, no strategy-proofness results exist for SMP-C. However, this result for SMP leads us to hypothesize that if we restrict our attention to SMP instances in which an R opt matching exists, then a mechanism that returns the R opt matching is strategy-proof. Unfortunately, this is not true; furthermore, the even stronger condition of there being a unique stable matching for a problem instance doesn't guarantee strategy-proofness for the residents (let alone the hospitals). However, we do show that when there is an R opt matching, residents have no incentive to misreport their preferences via truncation. Theorem 1. Restricting to instances of SMP-C in which an R opt matching exists, let y() be a mechanism that maps from such an instance to the R opt matching. Then y is strategyproof for residents if residents are only allowed to manipulate via truncations. However, y might not be strategy-proof if residents are allowed to manipulate via reordering.
Proof. Let µ * be the R opt matching. Part I: Truncations are strategy-proof. Suppose resident or couple d truncates its preferences at program or pair of programs p. Let Ω be the set of stable matchings before the truncation and let Ω be the set of stable matchings after the truncation. Because d's preferences above the truncation point are the same after truncation, any matching µ ∈ Ω where Figure 1 . The preferences provided above the line show doctors' and programs' true preferences. Couples are identified by their doctor-doctor pair, and give joint preferences as expected. Given these true preferences, only one stable matching exists (shown in the third column above the line). However, even though only one stable matching exists (and thus this matching is R opt ), the single doctor r 0 has incentive to misreport preferences via reordering. Instead of reporting a b c d (r 0 's true preferences) r 0 can be matched to b instead of c by reporting b d c a.
(All other participants in the market report their true preferences.) This results in the matching seen in the third column below the line, a matching that is not stable under the original preferences, where single doctor r 0 is better off than when they reported their true preferences.
Roth and Peranson investigate strategy-proofness for both residents and hospitals empirically in the NRMP setting [1999] . They do this via truncations. In their setting, they do find that residents can benefit (albeit minimally) from truncating their true preferences. We then hypothesize that this is due either: i) the instances in their setting frequently do not contain an R opt matching, or ii) their algorithm (RP99) does not find the R opt matching even when it does exist. In Section 5 we will see that both of these situations can occur. That is, on many problems no R opt matching exists (the best one can do is an RP opt matching). And even when an R opt matching does exist, their algorithm might not find it, reporting some other stable matching instead.
Solving SMP-C
In this section we examine solution methods for finding stable matchings for SMP-C. The standard approach has been to find an extension of the deferred acceptance algorithm that can handle couples. However, these extensions are incomplete: they are unable to determine whether or not a stable matching exists, and even when a stable matching does exist they might not be able to find one.
Since SMP-C is known to be NP-Complete [Ronn, 1990] it is also possible to encode it as another NP-Complete problem. In particular, it can be encoded as a SAT (satisfiability) problem. The advantage of doing this is that there has been a great deal of work on SAT solvers and state-of-the-art SAT solvers are routinely able to solve SAT problems involving millions of clauses.
1 The advantage of encoding SMP-C to SAT and then using a SAT solver is that this approach is complete: given sufficient compute resources it will either find a stable matching or prove that none exists.
Existing DA Algorithms for SMP-C
The basic principle of DA algorithms [Gale and Shapley, 1962] is that members of one side of the market propose down their ROLs while the other side either rejects those proposals or holds them until they see a better proposal: once all proposals have been made that side accepts the proposal they have not rejected (acceptance of proposals is deferred until the end).
Roth and Peranson develop a DA algorithm, RP99, capable of dealing with couples [1999] . This well known algorithm has been used with considerable success in practice, including most famously for finding matches for the NRMP which typically involves about 30,000 doctors [NRMP, 2013] . Using the description in [Roth and Peranson, 1999] we have implemented RP99. RP99 employs an iterative scheme. After computing a stable matching for all single doctors, couples are added one at a time and a new stable matching computed after each addition. The algorithm uses DA at each stage to find these stable matchings. Matching a couple can make previously made matches unstable and in redoing these matches the algorithm might start to cycle. Hence, cycle checking (or a timeout) is sometimes needed to terminate the algorithm.
Kojima et al. develop a simple "sequential couples algorithm" [2013] . This algorithm is analyzed to prove that the probability of a stable matchings existing goes to one under certain assumptions. However, this simple algorithm is not useful in practice as it declares failure under very simple conditions. Kojima et al. also provide a more practical DA algorithm, KPR, that they use in their experiments. We have implemented KPR. The main difference between KPR and RP99 is that KPR deals with all couples at the same time-it does not attempt to compute intermediate stable matchings. Interestingly, this makes KPR much more successful (and efficient) in our experiments.
Finally, Ashlagi et al. extend the analysis of Kojima et al., developing a more sophisticated "Sorted Deferred Acceptance Algorithm" and analyzing its behaviour [2014] . This algorithm is designed mainly to be amenable to theoretical analysis rather than for practical application. We have not implemented this algorithm so we do not include any empirical results about its performance.
Solving SMP via SAT
We have developed an effective encoding of SMP-C into SAT. This encoding and its performance is reported on in [Drum-
c : r 3 r 0 µ((r 3 , r 4 )) = (a, We call this encoding SAT-E, and given an SMP-C instance D, C , P , ROLs , where ROLs is the set of all participant ROLs, SAT-E( D, C , P , ROLs ) can be viewed as a function that returns a SAT encoding in CNF (conjunctive normal form), which is the input format taken by modern SAT solvers.
There are three things to know about SAT-E. 1. For any SMP-C instance I = D, C , P , ROLs , the satisfying models of SAT-E stand in a one-to-one correspondence with the stable models of I. This allows us to enumerate all stable models (see below). is true if and only if in µ, the stable matching corresponding to π, c is matched to a program pair they rank i or above in their ROL.
Given SAT-E and the above three facts we can develop two simple yet powerful algorithms: one for enumerating all stable models and the other for finding a Pareto Optimal matching, an RP opt matching, that dominates a stable matching µ.
Algorithm 1 is our algorithm for enumerating all stable models. It uses a sequence of calls to a SAT solver to do this. It first constructs the SAT-E encoding of the SMP-C instance then enters a loop. Each time through the loop a new stable model is found by the SAT solver, and a blocking clause c 2 For the reader's convenience we have included a description of this encoding in the appendix. See [Drummond et al., 2015] for full details. is added to the SAT-E encoding. This clause c is a disjunction that says that no future solution is allowed to return the same stable model (one of the mappings µ(d) = p of the corresponding stable model must be different, i.e., one of the variables m d [p] made true by µ must be false in every future matching). Algorithm 2 is our algorithm for finding a RP opt matching that dominates an inputted stable matching µ. The algorithm takes an SMP-C instances as input and constructs the SAT-E encoding for that instance. It then blocks the match µ from being a satisfying solution (using the same kind of clause as Algo. 1) and also forces the next match found to be R the current match. It accomplishes this by adding a clause for each single doctor d that says that d must be matched to a program it ranks at least as high as µ(d), and for every couple c a (unit) clause that says that c must be matched to a pair of programs it ranks at least as highly as µ(c). This causes the new match to be R to the current match, and since the new match cannot be equal it must be R the current match. That ALGORITHM 2: Given an SMP-C instance and a stable matching µ find a dominating RPopt matching.
Input: I = D, C , P , ROLs an SMP-C instance and µ a stable matching for I Output: An RPopt matching for I that dominates µ 1 while true do is, the new match must dominate the current match. If no dominating match can be found, the current match is RP opt and we return it.
Empirical Results
In this section we report on various experiments we performed. We used the state-of-the art SAT solver LingeLing [Biere, 2013] to solve our encoding SAT-E; Algorithm 1 to find all stable matches; and our implementation of the two DA algorithms RP99 and KPR, described in Section 4.1, when testing the effectiveness of DA algorithms.
Statistical models
We experiment with randomly generated SMP-C instances.
In our experiments we confine our attention to instances in which all program quotas are 1. So these are one-to-one matching problems with couples. We generate ordered lists from sets using a common random sampling procedure. To obtain an ordered list L of size k from a set S, given that we already generated the first i items, we draw elements from S independently and uniformly at random until we find an element e that does not already appear in L. Once we have selected such an e it becomes the i + 1'th item of L. This process stops when L has k items.
We use market sizes of size n where n ranges from 200 to 20,000, and varying percentages x of couples. For each n we include n doctors in D and n programs in P . Among the doctors we mark 1 − x percent as being singles and the remaining x percent are paired into couples. (Thus we have x * n/2 couples and n − x * n singles). For each single we randomly generate an ordered ROL of length 5 from P (using the procedure described above), each couple has an ROL of length 15 randomly generated from P + × P + − {(nil , nil )}, and each program has an ROL that includes all doctors that ranked it (including one member of a couple) and is randomly generated from that same set. For each setting of the parameters, we drew 50 problem instances. 
Experiments
Existence of a Stable Matching in SMP-C Our first experiment involves running a SAT solver on each SMP-C instance. This allows us to determine how often these instances had a stable match. Figure 2 shows the trend. We see that as the fraction of residents who are in couples increases, the fraction of satisfiable instances drops fairly rapidly. Interestingly, it appears as though this effect is independent of the size of the market; for all market sizes drawn, the fraction of satisfiable instances is fairly consistent, and follows the same trend. These results agree with the predictions of Ashlagi et al. who showed that in a random model similar but not identical to ours whenever the number of couples grows linearly with market size, the probability of no stable matching existing is a constant. This agrees with our data that market size has little effect. There model was not, however, able to predict what that probability might be, nor how it might change as the percentage of couples increases.
It can also be noted that the results presented here (20,000 couples with an average single's ROL of size 5) are of a size comparable to the NRMP, where there are 34,355 residents with an average single's ROL of size 11 [NRMP, 2013] . On NRMP Roth and Peranson [1999] remark that historically no instance was found not to have a stable matching. This might arise from (a) the percentage of couples being very small for NRMP, or (b) extra structure in this real problem not present in our random problems. If the cause is (a) there might be practical concerns for the ability of clearinghouse mechanisms to find stable matchings if the percentage of couples rises. Figure 3 shows the fraction of instances that had a unique stable matchings as the size of the market increases, and as the percentage of the couples in the market increases. Importantly, this figure only counts the fraction of instances with a unique matching among those instances that have at least one matching. This data was generated by running Algo. 1. As shown in Figure 2 , the fraction of instances where a stable matching exists changes as the percentage of couples in the market changes. So to remove that underlying trend, we only look instances where a stable matching is known to exist.
Existence of a Unique Stable Matching in SMP-C
Note that, while these curves generally mimic the pattern we'd expect to see (the fraction of unique matchings tends to increase as the market size gets larger), the curve appears to level out and reach an asymptote much earlier than expected. In our experiments, no setting reached more than 84% unique matchings.
Immorlica and Mahdian proved that, for SMP (where at least one stable matching is always true) with fixed length ROLs (and everyone drawing from some given distribution), the chance of drawing a problem with only one stable matching goes to 1 as the size of the market goes to infinity [2005] .
Our trends for SMP-C, however, appear somewhat asymptotic, especially when the percentage of couples is low. It thus appears that, at least for the size of problems relative to the size of ROL investigated here, that the Immorlica and Mahdian results do not apply. This could be because their results give very large bounds that require the size of the problems to be much larger than drawn here. So our results might not be on sufficiently large markets to capture the phenomenon they describe. Alternately, this could be because their results do not hold for SMP-C.
As an aside, when comparing the fraction of unique satisfiable instances out of all problem instances drawn, the numbers look even worse; with a market size of 20,000 and 20% couples, the percentage of problems drawn with only one stable matching drops to 50%.
Properties of the Set of Matchings for SMP-C
We next investigate the properties of the set of matchings of each SMP-C instance as generated by Algorithm 1. We have shown that, at least under the settings explored in this paper, unique stable matches are not as common as we may have hypothesized. We also have proven that, even if a unique matching exists (and hence it is an R opt matching), that is no guarantee of strategy-proofness on either the residents' or programs' side for SMP-C. Nevertheless, we have also shown that if residents are only allowed to truncate their preferences (which is arguably the easiest misreporting strategy), then they have no incentive to misreport if an R opt matching exists. Since an R opt matching can exist even when there more than one stable matching, this can be a useful situation that covers more cases than having only one stable matching. Figure 4 shows our results about this question. The boxes in this plot represents the average number of stable matches for different problem parameters; the whisker represents one standard deviation. For the problems we investigated, the average number of stable matchings was quite low (1.30), and did not seem to be affected much by either the size of the market, or the percentage of couples involved in the market. Note that exceedingly few problem instances have more than 3 stable matches, no matter how the parameters are set. Also, in each setting of the parameters, problem instances with one and two stable matchings are very common. Note that, unlike the previous analysis presented in Figure 2 , we are looking at all problem instances, not just the satisfiable ones.
In the problems we investigated, 10.63% had no stable matching, 61.91% had a unique stable matching, 21.89% had two stable matchings, 0.31% had three stable matchings, 4.69% had four stable matchings, 0.13% had six stable matchings, and 0.44% had eight stable matchings.
When a problem instance has more than one stable matching, we are particularly interested in how many RP opt matchings exist. If only one RP opt matching exists this matching is also an R opt matching, and our theoretical result applies: residents have no incentive to misreport their preferences by truncation. 78.5% of all problem instances drawn had an R opt matching, which is many more instances than simply had a single stable matching (61.91%). Addition- ally, if we again look at the Immorlica and Mahdian results, but with respect to fraction of satisfiable instance that had an R opt matching instead of the more restrictive condition of having only one stable matchings, we see a trend much closer to what we might expect. See Figure 5 . Furthermore, many instances with a low percentage of couples almost always had an R opt matching; when the market had 1% couples, 98.5% of all satisfiable instances had an R opt matching; with 5%, 92.7% had an R opt matching. Importantly, this means that for many of the problem instances that we drew, residents have no incentive to misreport their preferences via truncation. However, further investigation is required to ascertain the relationship between the percentage of couples in a matching and the fraction of instances that have an R opt matching.
Finally, looked at those instances with more than one stable matching to see how many, on average, RP opt matchings they contain. We found that in some cases RP opt matchings are quite common. When there are two stable matchings for a given problem instance, there were an average of 1.36 RP opt matchings per problem. Instances with 3 stable matchings always had 3 RP opt matchings per problem. Instances with 4 stable matchings had an average of 1.69 RP opt matchings per problem, and instances with 8 stable matchings had an average of 4 RP opt per problem.
Structure of SMP-C Problem Instances
In this section we examine some finer grained structure among the set of stable matchings. We examined the stable matchings and a basis for the set of Pareto improving moves. A Pareto improving move is the set of resident transfers needed to transform matching µ 2 to matching µ 1 when µ 1 R µ 2 (i.e., the transfers improve the match). Improving moves that are the result of combining other improving are not counted as part of the basis.
We show this structure as a directed graph, where nodes are stable matchings for a given instance, and an edge goes from node a to b if there is a Pareto improving move transforming a to b. (Note this implies that b R a. Note this graph is not guaranteed to be connected, and in practice, many of these graphs have multiple components. By definition, each component will contain at least one RP opt matching. While it appears to be exceedingly rare for any component to contain more than one component (at least in the problems we generated), we did find one component with two RP opt matchings.
For an illustration of what these components and the possible Pareto improving moves may look like, see Figure 6 . For the problem instance chosen, there were 8 stable matchings, 2 of which were RP opt matchings. Each node in the graph contains a tuple of the singles' and couples' average rank; each edge on the graph is the maximum improvement for any single and any couple from the previous match to the new Pareto improved match.
Also note that in this problem instance, on average, one of these RP opt matchings is better for couples (by 0.03 positions on average) and one of these RP opt matchings is better for singles (by 0.0002 positions on average). Interestingly, there are very few unique Pareto optimal moves in this graph; there are only two. This tends to hold in general; when there are two stable matchings, there are an average of 0.64 unique Pareto moves per problem. With 4 stable matchings, there are an average of 1.48 Pareto moves.
Note that, for the single that has the greatest incentive to go from one matching to another, they have quite a high incentive-almost their entire ROL. (Remember, singles give a ROL of size 5.) Note that Figure 6 shows a case where only single residents improve; this is not true in the general case. Couples, likewise, can greatly benefit from moving from a non-Pareto optimal matching to a RP opt matching. Additionally, some singles and couples will strongly prefer one RP opt matching over another; in this example, the maximum incentive for any single to switch from the RP opt matching on the left to the one on the right is moving up their ROL 3 positions. In this example, there is no incentive for couples to switch from the RP opt matching on the left to the one on the right. For switching from the RP opt matching on the right to the one on the left, the maximum incentive for any single to move is one position in their ROL, and 3 positions for any couple. In this instance, both of the DA algorithms KPR and RP99 found the same RP opt matching, denoted by the square node in the graph. While KPR and RP99 are not guaranteed to find an RP opt matching, they did in this instance.
While in this example, there is little incentive to switch from one RP opt matching to another, there were instances in the data where at least one single could move up their entire preference list by switching from one RP opt matching to another, and at least one couple could move up their entire preference list by switching from one RP opt matching to another.
The Performance of DA Algorithms for SMP-C
We are also interested in how the standard DA-style algorithms perform with respect to finding RP opt matchings. As Roth and Peranson mention that resident optimality is an important design aspect for stable matching algorithms, we investigate how frequently the DA algorithms find a RP opt matching. We do this by using Algo 1 to enumerate all possible stable matchings for each problem instance. We then identify all RP opt matchings, and then see if the DA algorithms find a RP opt matching for that instance. Table 5 .4 shows these results. We did not find much of a relationship between the size of the problem and how frequently the DA algorithms found an RP opt matching, so we combine all problem sizes for this analysis. Note that, when analyzing the % of times the DA algorithm found an RP opt matching, we only look at problems where (a) more than one stable matching exists (if only one stable matching exists, that solution is automatically an RP opt matching) and (b) the DA algorithm found a matching (the DA algorithms have different failure rates and we wanted to directly compare only when they succeed.) Table 5 .4 also shows the general failure rate for the DA algorithms (i.e., when at least one stable matching exists, but the algorithm fails to find one). Critically, note that even though the DA algorithms were designed to be as resident favoring as possible, they do not find an RP opt matching in a large percentage of problems with multiple stable matchings. When the percentage of couples is low, the DA algorithms' performance is either perfect, or fairly good (with about a 5% failure rate). For problems with roughly the same percentage of couples as the NRMP (roughly 6%) the failure rate of KPR and RP99 to find a RP opt matching is fairly low, at 5% (though KPR's failure rate is slightly higher.) However, with more couples in the match, the failure rate jumps to roughly 10%. Again, in all of these settings, SAT-E with the additional constraints was able to enumerate all stable matchings, including all RP opt matchings.
It appears as though RP99 finds an RP opt matching with a slightly higher rate than KPR when it finishes. These two algorithms deal with couples fairly differently (as RP99 has couples propose individually, and couples propose in-batch in KPR), which could account for the difference in performance. However, KPR outperforms RP99 by a large margin with respect to the percentage of problem instances solved. KPR's failure rate is less than 0.25% for all problems with 10% or less couples, and only 5.75% when the match has 20% couples. RP99's failure rate grows quickly, reaching 36.25% by the time couples consist of 20% of the market. Therefore, it seems as though there is a slight benefit to using RP99 to find RP opt matchings, but its large failure rate may negate this benefit.
Discussion and Future Work
In this paper, we have provided new theoretical results on strategy-proofness for SMP-C, and new extensions to an existing SAT encoding for SMP-C that allows us to both enumerate every stable matching for a given problem instance, and guarantee that we've found a RP opt matching if we don't have the resources to enumerate all instances. We then used these techniques to explore properties of SMP-C instances. We used these tools to empirically investigate previous theoretical results. Interesting, and perhaps unexpectedly, the Immorlica and Mahdian results (given a constant list size, the probability of a unique stable matching goes to one as the market size increases) did not seem to hold. However, we empirically found evidence for a related phenomenon for SMP-C, leading us to the following conjecture: for problem instances drawn from the same distribution with a fixed ROL size of k, the probability of a resident optimal stable matching goes to one as the size of the market goes to infinity.
We also empirically evaluated RP99 and KPR, two DAstyle algorithms for SMP-C that do not have any theoretical guarantees. While they frequently perform well on the problem instances we drew, we found many problem instances where they either did not find a stable matching at all even though one existed, or if they did find one, they did not find a RP opt matching. In practice, it would be a simple to use our algorithm 2 to improve the matching found by these algorithms.
By enumerating all possible stable matchings (and thus all resident Pareto optimal matchings for a given matching), we can now pick stable matchings based on certain properties. Enumerating the set of all stable matchings allows us to pick the matching with the best average rank for all singles and couples (a sort of resident social-welfare optimal matching), or the stable matching that places the worst-off individual as high in their preference rankings as possible. While we did not empirically evaluate this in this paper, being able to enumerate all stable matchings allows for a rich investigation into this problem.
Our overall conclusion is that encoding to SAT is a powerful tool for further empirical analysis of stable matching problems. The research question that arises is how best to use this tool and how this tool can be adapted to obtain insight into other important open questions about NP-complete stable matching problems. The current paper has shown that this tool has already exposed some interesting theoretical questions. For example, what can be proved about the frequency in which resident-optimal matchings appear in randomly drawn SMP-C instances as the market size increases; is there further structure to the set of RP opt solutions; can the existence of a resident-optimal matching or conditions on the set of RP opt solutions be used to prove further strategyproof results for SMP-C.
In addition to theoretical results, there is considerable potential for practical computation of stable matchings. For example, using both DA algorithms, and algorithm 2 to improve the resulting matching might have some very useful applications. It might also be the case that solving SAT-E with additional constraints might be applicable to some currently unsolved practical matching problems.
